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The Proximity of Nothing 
One of the aims of Alenka Zupančič in writing What IS Sex was not, we can be sure, 
facilitating a rapprochement between psychoanalytic thinking and the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger. Although Zupančič does mention Heidegger’s name in the book, 
she does so to point out the distance between the psychoanalytic position and 
Heidegger’s. Furthermore, her approach to psychoanalysis does not lend itself to the 
questions that preoccupy Heidegger. Even if Zupančič were theoretically disposed to 
highlight a link to Heidegger’s thought, now would hardly be the time, given the ebb 
in his reputation after the publication of his overt anti-Semitism in the Black 
Notebooks.  
 Zupančič clearly distinguishes the psychoanalytic position (that she associates 
with Lacan) from that of Heidegger. As she sees it, the contrast involves how each 
approaches subjectivity (or what Heidegger calls Dasein). From the perspective of 
psychoanalytic theory, Heidegger gives death a dramatizing power for Dasein that 
properly belongs to enjoyment. It is not our relationship to death that differentiates 
the human as such but a relationship to enjoyment that constitutes the subject. She 
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states, “the structural place occupied, in Heidegger, by death as the very mode of 
human finitude that grounds specifically human immortality), becomes with Lacan 
the real of enjoyment, jouissance.”1 According to Zupančič, Heidegger gets caught up 
in the problematic of death without seeing that death only matters for the subject 
because it represents the cessation of its enjoyment.  
 Despite all these factors that suggest Heidegger’s absence from the concerns 
of What IS Sex?, an intersection with Heidegger nonetheless occurs at the decisive 
moment of the book.2 The most important insight of Alenka Zupančič’s What IS Sex? 
is her definition of subjectivity not as one expects, through signification – the subject 
is the speaking being, the subject of the signifier – but through a lack in signification. 
The subject is not so much the subject of the signifier as the subject of the absent 
signifier.3 For Zupančič, the key to language lies in what it subtracts rather than in 
what it makes available for the human being. It takes away one signifier in an act that 
Zupančič equates with what Freud calls primal repression.  
 Zupančič locates the emergence of the humanity at the moment of the 
unconscious recognition of the absent signifier. As Zupančič puts it, “the human 
(his)story begins not with the emergence of the signifier, but with one signifier ‘gone 
missing.’”4 This conspicuous absence of the signifier that would complete 
signification is not just not there. It is present as an absence. In Zupančič’s idiom, 
signification is “with without-one.”5 This present absence shapes not just how the 
subject emerges as a subject but its entire trajectory. Primal repression – the 
repression of the impossible final signifier that could complete signification – doesn’t 
occur once and then vanish but constantly weighs on the signifying system with 
what this system includes as an absence.6 
 By formulating an ontology of subtraction in which the very existence of beings 
depends the presence of nothing, Zupančič, without directly avowing it, reveals the 
hidden proximity of psychoanalytic theory and Heidegger’s philosophy. Zupančič’s 
psychoanalytic version of ontology shows that being is not just a neutral field. In 
order for there to be beings, there must be nothing. She reveals the ontological 
necessity of nothingness in a way that resonates with Heidegger’s insistence on this 
same ontological necessity. For both Zupančič and Heidegger, nothing is not the 
contrary of being but its sine qua non.  
 When we examine signification, we can see the traces of the subtraction of 
this nothing. Signification at once obscures the ontological status of nothing and 
points us to it through the necessity of primal repression. If we see primal repression 
as the repression or the subtraction of nothing, then the ontological status of nothing 
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becomes apparent. Or, as Zupančič contends, we recognize that there is “something 
in being that is less than being – and this something is precisely that which, while 
included in being, prevents it from being fully constituted as being.”7 This something 
is paradoxically nothing.  
 Zupančič’s insight into the necessary presence of nothing, while not an allusion 
to Heidegger, resonates with his philosophical project. In his famous lecture “What Is 
Metaphysics?,” Heidegger authors a panegyric to anxiety for its ability to reveal the 
nothing to us. The nothing, as Heidegger conceives it, constantly accompanies all 
beings but becomes apparent only in those moments when we abandon our 
preoccupation with a multiplicity of beings and consider Being as such. Though 
Heidegger doesn’t formulate our access to the nothing in terms of the signifier – 
specifically, the missing signifier – he nonetheless recognizes that the nothing plays a 
constitutive role for us. The nothing is not just a contingent part of our existence that 
we might encounter or not. 
 Like Zupančič, Heidegger grants the nothing a central ontological role. Without 
the presence of the nothing, we would have no possibility for self-awareness or for 
breaking from the various determinants that dictate our lives. It is the original 
encounter with nothingness that enables us to relate to anything at all. He claims, 
“Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence 
approach and penetrate beings.”8 For Heidegger, there are no beings without 
nothing, and Dasein has a privileged role in apprehending this nothing.  
 The nothing constantly accompanies us, though we spend most of our time 
trying to avoid confronting it. As a result, we don’t have a constant awareness of the 
nothing except in its abeyance. It is only the experience of anxiety that allows us to 
register the nothing in its constitutive force. In the experience of anxiety, we 
recognize that what we are, as Dasein, is “being held out into the nothing.”9 We work 
at avoiding the proximity of the nothing because this proximity always triggers 
anxiety. But rather than trying to avoid anxiety at all costs, Heidegger demands that 
we reevaluate the experience of anxiety and recognize the existential insight that it 
provides. Though we suffer anxiety, it also has the effect of freeing us from the power 
of the social determinants that otherwise dictate our lives. The difficulty of sustaining 
anxiety, however, constantly threatens our freedom. 
 Heidegger believes that the turn away from anxiety – and thus from the 
nothing – represents an existential catastrophe.10 In the effort to avoid the 
confrontation with the nothing, we distract ourselves with beings. We engage in 
activities like idle chatter and seek out constant novelty because they promise respite 
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from anxiety. But this avoidance deprives us of the freedom that we find in the 
profound experience of existence. In Heidegger’s early philosophy, our relationship to 
the nothing is the site of a morality play in which we stand to lose what is most 
valuable in our existence.11 
 Though Zupančič enables us to recognize the hidden connection between 
psychoanalysis and Heidegger, some distance nonetheless remains between them. 
Heidegger’s ethical and political critique of the contemporary world for its flight from 
the nothing fails to acknowledge how this flight is written into signification from the 
beginning. The turn away from the nothing is not a particular ethical failure of 
modernity or of certain individuals. It is rather constitutive of subjectivity, which is why 
we should not imagine that earlier epochs had a more authentic relationship to the 
nothing than modernity. The existential flight that Heidegger laments is an intrinsic 
part of subjectivity. Even the attempt to bypass subjectivity through an analysis of 
Dasein cannot short circuit the structural necessity of primal repression, which is 
what both makes possible the recognition of the nothing and makes impossible any 
direct encounter.  
 The avoidance of the nothing occurs through primal repression. Primal 
repression, as distinct from instances of secondary repression, is not optional. The 
fantasy that we could do without it is a fantasy of subjectivity without lack, which 
would eliminate the condition of possibility for the subject’s emergence. Getting rid of 
the primal repression of the nothing would make it impossible for subjects to 
recognize the nothing because they would not exist as subjects. They would be 
incapable of the anxiety that Heidegger sees as essential for the apprehension of the 
nothing.  
 By locating our relationship to the nothing in primal repression, Zupančič 
transforms Heidegger’s morality play centering on the nothing into a constitutive fact 
of the subject’s existence. In this sense, not only does Zupančič reformulate the 
psychoanalytic project around the centrality of the nothing and thereby reveal its 
hidden affinity with Heidegger. She also offers an indirect corrective to Heidegger’s 
conception of the nothing. It cannot be a matter of adopting a more courageous 
attitude and forgoing the distraction of beings in order to confront directly the horror 
of the nothing, as Heidegger proposes. Such a position fails to account for the fact 
that turn away from the nothing is the primal repression that constitutes our 
subjectivity. Paradoxically, it is the original repression of the nothing that makes 
possible the recognition of it.  
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 Once we understand the turn away from the nothing in terms of primal 
repression, the point ceases to be authentically taking on the anxiety that the 
confrontation with the nothing produces, as Heidegger proposes. The task instead 
involves how we comport ourselves to what is missing. The nothing is not a 
presence that we can directly encounter but an absence that we must acknowledge 
and integrate into our subjectivity. Rather than dwelling in the nothing, we register its 
absence. This is the corrective that Zupančič offers Heidegger.  
 
From Psychoanalysis to Heidegger 
 
It often seems as if there is an untraversable distance between the philosophers of 
existence and psychoanalytic theory. Though the latter accommodates itself well to 
dialectical thinkers like Hegel and Marx, it has not enjoyed the same close 
relationship with those in the existentialist tradition, like Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
and Simone de Beauvoir.12 This is undoubtedly because Heidegger, Sartre, and 
Beauvoir privilege experience and fail to recognize how experience fundamentally 
deceives us. The basic insight of psychoanalysis is that the unconscious shapes our 
subjectivity in a way that any conscious account of our experience cannot register. 
But one of the deleterious effects of the distance between the existentialist tradition 
and psychoanalytic theory is that the latter shies away from existential claims.  
 What IS Sex? does not completely bridge the gap that separates these two 
theoretical positions. But it points us in the direction of a foundational shared 
concern. This shared concern is with the constitutive role that nothingness plays in 
existence. Our relationship to nothingness is constitutive for all the thinkers in the 
existentialist tradition. Psychoanalytic theory, in contrast, seems to reduce nothing to 
the status of an epiphenomenon. This is why a rapprochement between the two 
projects has always seemed impossible.  
 A contrast between Heidegger and Freud’s attitudes toward someone 
claiming “it was nothing” will make the distance between the two positions clear. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger describes our response to a bout of anxiety. He writes, 
“When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed 
to say that ‘it was really nothing.’ And what it was, indeed, does get reached ontically 
by such a way of talking.”13 When we dismiss the cause of our anxiety as “nothing,” 
we ironically identify the cause correctly, despite our attempt not to talk about it. We 
think that we are dismissing the experience as nonconsequential, but we are 
unknowingly avowing its great consequence through the use of the term “nothing.” 
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Our inability to identify any positive cause for the anxiety points to the nothing itself 
as the cause. For Heidegger, when we say “nothing” here we really mean the nothing 
rather than not anything.  
 Freud takes a dramatically different tack concerning the garden variety 
statement about nothing. If I claim that my slip of the tongue meant nothing or that 
my dream signified nothing in an effort to dismiss its importance, Freud would 
conclude that such expressions of “nothing” conceal something – namely, repressed 
material. When I say “nothing,” I always mean something in the Freudian universe. In 
his essay “Negation,” Freud contends, “A negative judgement is the intellectual 
substitute for repression; its ‘no’ is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin – 
like, let us say, ‘Made in Germany.’ With the help of the symbol of negation, thinking 
frees itself from the restrictions of repression and enriches itself with material that is 
indispensable for its proper functioning.”14 For psychoanalysis, the dismissal of an 
experience of nothing becomes revelatory only when we interpret this nothing as a 
negation. By attempting to express nothing, I always signify something from the 
unconscious. For Freud, nothing is never just nothing.  
 In this sense, there is an almost perfect chiasmic opposition between 
Heidegger and psychoanalysis: Heidegger interprets negation as an unconscious 
awareness of nothing, whereas psychoanalysis interprets expressions of nothing as 
unconscious negations. The task of reconciling these two positions seems both 
impossible and inadvisable. Doing so risks violating one or the other or both in a 
bastard synthesis.  
 Thanks to What IS Sex?, however, the path to such a reconciliation becomes 
not only possible but also clearly illuminated. Zupančič’s theorization of primal 
repression – her insistence that signification must include a signifier that is absent – 
enables us to see how Heidegger and Freud (or existentialism and psychoanalysis) 
share a fundamental concern. This concern is the constitutive role of nothing in 
subjectivity. Instead of reducing every expression of nothing to a case of negation, 
Zupančič contends that psychoanalysis actually gives the nothing a central role. By 
looking at primal repression rather than just cases of secondary repression (as Freud 
does in the “Negation” essay), Zupančič shifts the terrain of psychoanalytic theory in 
the direction of Heidegger. Through the concept of primal repression, psychoanalysis 
understands that the nothing is actually included within signification in the form of a 
present absence. Without the nothing in the form of the included missing signifier, 
subjects would not emerge as subjects. They emerge through the registration of 
nothing in the signifying chain, and all their negations that might signal secondary 
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repression also harken back to this primal repression of nothing. In this way, 
Zupančič offers an addendum to Freud’s “Negation” essay: every “no” is not just an 
affirmation of some positive unconscious material; it is also – and more importantly – 
an affirmation of the constitutive role that the nothing plays for subjectivity. 
 In her effort to transform psychoanalytic theory into an ontology, Zupančič 
reveals the intersection between psychoanalysis and Heidegger. Though this is not 
her explicit aim in What IS Sex?, Zupančič demonstrates how psychoanalysis can 
offer a corrective to existential philosophy. By aligning the nothing with primal 
repression, we can avoid the division of the world into those authentic beings 
courageous enough to endure the anxiety of the nothing and the fallen who have 
succumbed to the lure of an existential flight. If there is any authenticity to be had, it 
lies in recognizing the impossibility of any authenticity, in grasping that none of us 
can attain a privileged relation to the nothing because of the constitutive role that it 
plays for all of us. Since we encounter the nothing only through recognizing that we 
miss it, our only recourse is to grasp the radical equality that derives from this shared 
existential failure.  
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